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Abstract
International carbon markets have grown quickly in recent years, but have also expe-
rienced serious problems and faced harsh criticism. This paper looks at the history
of climate science, at how the economics of emissions trading developed, and at the
formation of international institutions to address climate change. From this histor-
ical perspective it appears that climate change was a problem in need of a solution,
and that emissions trading was a solution in search of bigger and bigger problems
to solve. The political pressure to reach an international climate agreement was
building rapidly in the 1990s, and the resulting marriage of climate change and car-
bon markets occurred before the quality of the match could be adequately assessed.
Many of the problems with international carbon markets can, at a fundamental level,
be traced to this imperfect match. This panoramic historical perspective draws at-
tention to the fact that climate change is a very diﬀerent kind of pollution problem
than emissions trading was originally designed to remedy. This helps shed light on
recent experiences, and on how international carbon markets must change to provide
the benefits they promise.
1 Introduction
The Kyoto Protocol created an international market for allowances to emit six green-
house gases, chiefly carbon dioxide. Today, the world carbon trade includes compliance
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markets in the EU, the US, and New Zealand, representing over 140 billion dollars in
traded value and as much as 5 gigatons of emissions per year (Linacre et al., 2011). With
talk of enlarging the world carbon trade further, with proposed markets in Australia and
Japan, the international market is projected to reach magnitudes of $2-3 trillion by 2020
(Lazarowicz, 2009). Despite doubts surrounding a post-Kyoto international framework,
international carbon markets remain a key component of many countries’ carbon policy
(see, for instance, European Commission, 2011).
Yet, carbon markets have also suﬀered from severe growing pains. They have been
criticized for not generating real emissions reductions—“hot air” in the Kyoto Protocol
and overallocation of allowances in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) (Reyes,
2011). They have been rebuked for providing financial windfalls to emitters—both with
the admittance of HFC-23 projects into the Clean Development Mechanism (Wara,
2007a,b) and the near universal grandfathering of permits in the EU ETS (Elsworth
and Worthington, 2010; Elsworth et al., 2011). They have been admonished for lacking
even basic safeguards against fraud—examples include the VAT fraud and the recycling
of already surrendered emissions allowances. Several national EU ETS registries were
recently forced to shut down in response to one instance of theft. The international
carbon markets have also been criticised for not providing the incentives for low-carbon
innovation proﬀered by economists and politicians (Schleich and Betz, 2005).
Place this against a backdrop of economic theory emphasizing the static and dy-
namic eﬃciency of emissions trading, the lauded success of the US Acid Rain Program
in the 1990s, and the acceptance of emissions trading by both business and environmen-
tal interest groups. With this background, how can we explain the recent experience
with carbon markets? Are they coincidental institutional failures, or are they perhaps
symptoms of a more fundamental problem?
This paper pieces together an account of the origins of international carbon markets.
Accounts of the origin of international carbon markets tend to focus either on the history
of climate science (Fleming, 1998; Weart, 2003), on how the economics of emissions
trading developed (Oates, 2000; Gorman and Solomon, 2002; Vosharp, 2007), or on the
formation of international institutions to address climate change (Bolin, 2007). These
historical accounts are illuminating and rich in detail, but some important lessons emerge
clearly only when looking at the scientific, economic, and political perspectives side-by-
side (e.g. Hulme, 2009). We do this in sections 2, 3, and 4. In section 5 we examine
how these perspectives became integrated and how the international carbon market was
created.
A picture emerges of international carbon markets as a hasty marriage of science
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of climate change and economics of emissions trading, spurred on by political pressure
to reach an international climate agreement. This was facilitated and encouraged by a
growing scientific and popular understanding of the potential consequences of unchecked
greenhouse gas emissions, and a willingness to draw very general lessons from economic
arguments. To paraphrase Kingdon (1997), climate change was a problem in search of
a solution, emissions trading was a solution in search of a problem, and international
negotiations served as the forum in where this problem and this solution eventually came
to be united.
We add detail to this sketch in section 6. The resulting picture helps us under-
stand the troubled beginnings of international carbon markets, and suggests how carbon
markets must change if they are to have hope of realising the benefits they promise.
2 Scientific origins
“Man is both creature and moulder of his environment”; these are the opening words of
the Stockholm Declaration (1972). The idea of ‘Man as moulder’ is central to interna-
tional climate change policy and the creation of the international carbon market. This
section tells the story of how we came to understand our ability to influence the climate
through our emissions of greenhouse gases.
In 1815, Jean-Pierre Perraudin speculated that large displaced boulders in the Swiss
alps might be due to glaciers previously having extended farther into the valleys. 25
years later Louis Agassiz proposed the theory that prehistoric glaciers had moved across
the European and North American continents. The idea was considered blasphemous at
first, since it contradicted the theory that the biblical flood had displaced the boulders.
However, as evidence of an ice age continued to mount, the scientific community instead
became interested in explaining how temperatures could have varied enough to produce
such rapid glacial advances and retreats (Riebeek, 2005).
As early as 1681, Edame Mariotte had noted that the sun’s rays appeared to move
more easily through glass and other transparent materials than did the rays from a heat
lamp. In the 1760s and 1770s, Horace Benedict de Saussure experimented with a so-
lar thermometer designed to capture, magnify, and measure the heat of the sun’s rays
(Fleming, 1998). His ‘heliothermometer’ was in a sense an experimental greenhouse,
but Saussure did not understand the physical mechanisms that magnified the heliother-
mometer’s internal temperature. Inspired by Saussure, however, French mathematician
and physicist Joseph Fourier began exploring the ‘laws’ governing the transmission of
heat through solids and liquids, published in his The´orie Analytique de la Chaleur in
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1822 (Fleming, 1998).
However, Fourier’s equations predicted a temperature far below the Earth’s actual
temperature (Weart, 2003). The problem was clear; his theory left out gases. Fourier
understood that the atmosphere played an important role in regulating temperatures,
famously remarking that
. . . the temperature can be augmented by the interposition of the atmosphere,
because heat in the state of light finds less resistance in penetrating the air,
than in repassing into the air when converted into non-luminous heat.
— Fourier (1824, p. 13)1
Fourier experimented with the transmission of heat through transparent substances,
such as panes of glass, but he was never able to extend his theory to gases.
British scientist John Tyndall had studied the radiative properties of gases early in
his career, and returned to these questions once more in 1859, motivated by the mystery
of the ice age. He suspected that the recent ice age might have been caused by variations
in the atmosphere’s carbon content (Weart, 2003). The scientific consensus of the day
was that gases were transparent to thermal radiation, but Tyndall demonstrated exper-
imentally that water vapour, carbon dioxide, ozone, hydrocarbons, and several other
gases could absorb heat (Weart, 2003). He thought carbon dioxide and water vapour,
absorbing many times more heat than oxygen and nitrogen, were important in explain-
ing the Earth’s temperature. Thanks to Tyndall’s work, American geophysicist William
Ferrel had a much better understanding than Fourier of the atmosphere’s heat-trapping
properties when, in 1884, he attempted to calculate the Earth’s average temperature.
He came much closer to reality than Fourier had ever managed (Fleming, 1998).
Fourier, Tyndall, and others had relied on experiments to formulate theories that
they later tried to apply to phenomena outside of their laboratories. For Swedish elec-
trochemist Svante Arrhenius, however, the starting point was to try to come up with a
theory to fit to some poorly understood phenomena—an approach made possible in the
climate sciences by the recent expansion of standardised climatological measurement.
In countries around the world, geographical coverage of temperature measurements had
been extended in the second half of the 19th century, and the measurement instruments
and practices had been gradually standardised. The Prussian Meteorological Institute
was founded in 1847, the British Meteorological Society in 1850, the US Weather Bureau
in 1870, the Bureau Central Me´te´orologique de France in 1877, and other such networks
1The statement was first published in 1824 in French. Quote is taken from the English translation.
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formed in Italy, Russia, and elsewhere. The International Meteorological Organization
(now the World Meteorological Organization) was founded in 1873 (Fleming, 1998).
Combining climatological measurements from a number of sources with well-known
physical relationships, Arrhenius (1896) calculated the changes in terrestrial tempera-
tures that would result from variation in the atmospheric concentration of carbon diox-
ide, taking into account the concurrent changes in humidity. A small initial decrease in
temperature would lower the air’s capacity to carry water vapour, which would diminish
the atmosphere’s heat-trapping capacity, further diminishing humidity, etc. Taking this
positive feedback mechanism into account, Arrhenius found that
the temperature in the arctic regions would rise about 8◦ to 9◦C., if the
carbonic acid increased to 2.5 or 3 times its present value. In order to get
the temperature of the ice age between the 40th and 50th parallels, the
carbonic acid in the air should sink to 0.62–0.55 of its present value (lowering
of temperature 4◦–5◦).
— Arrhenius (1896, p. 268)
Variations of such magnitude could explain both the warmer Tertiary and the subse-
quent ice age. Although it was not clear what accounted for such historical fluctuations
of carbon dioxide levels, Arrhenius, quoting geologist Arvid Ho¨gbom at length, favoured
the theory that volcanic eruptions might cause changes in climate. At the time, Arrhe-
nius did not imagine that human activity could noticeably magnify the global greenhouse
eﬀect.
Industrial carbon emissions grew rapidly in subsequent years, however, and Arrhe-
nius’ collegue Nils Ekholm soon began arguing that the burning of fossil fuels would
“undoubtedly cause a very obvious rise in the mean temperature of the Earth” (Ekholm,
1901, p. 61).2 He believed, though, that the eﬀect would only be felt over millennia.
By 1904, annual industrial carbon emissions were nearly twice what they were when
Arrhenius had first published. In 1906, Arrhenius wrote that “the advances of industry”
might noticeably increase the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide “in the course
of a few centuries” (Arrhenius, 1908, p. 54).3
But in the early 20th century, it was experimentally concluded that the heat absorp-
tion capacity of the carbon dioxide in the atmosphere was already saturated. Changes
in concentration, it seemed, would have little or no eﬀect on temperature. Arrhenius’
2The article was published in Swedish in 1899. The quote is taken from its English translation from
1901.
3Quoted from the 1908 English translation.
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theories were abandoned and many climate scientists turned their attention to comple-
mentary streams of research, like mapping deep ocean currents and the carbon cycle
(Fleming, 1998; Weart, 2003).
British engineer Guy Stewart Callendar went against the grain when, in 1938, he
presented meticulously collated evidence that carbon dioxide emissions were causing
the recent rise in temperatures. Few paid much attention (Weart, 2003), but Callendar
continued to gather and analyse temperature and emissions data. Ultimately he managed
to revive scientific interest in the theory among a new generation of climate scientists.
Starting in the 1940s and continuing through the 1950s, military funds were in-
creasingly channeled into climate science, especially in the US (Weart, 2003). This new
generation of climate scientists were being trained during the Second World War and
the Cold War, and were highly skilled in physics and computing. They followed Cal-
lendar’s lead, collecting more accurate measurements and building more sophisticated
climate models. Better weather stations were built, and the first weather satellites were
launched. Gilbert Plass provided new and more detailed calculations on the relationship
between carbon dioxide and temperatures; Norman Philips pioneered computational cli-
mate models that have formed the basis for the general circulation models used today;
Roger Revelle and Hans Seuss greatly improved our understanding the carbon dioxide
absorption capacity of the oceans; Charles Keeling developed the first device able to
measure atmospheric carbon dioxide levels directly from samples, and produced the fa-
mous Keeling curve from observations gathered at the Mauna Loa observatory. The era
of modern climate science had begun.
3 Economic origins
A scientific understanding of the human-enhanced greenhouse eﬀect is not suﬃcient to
account for the creation of the international carbon market. Indeed, both Ekholm and
Arrhenius believed that “by the influence of increasing percentage of carbonic acid in
the atmosphere, we may hope to enjoy ages with more equable and better climates”
(Arrhenius, 1908, p. 63), even to “prevent the arrival of a new Ice Age” (Ekholm, 1901,
p. 61). Callendar agreed, believing that warming would benefit humanity since “the
return of deadly glaciers should be delayed indefinitely” (Callendar, 1938, p. 236). This
could hardly have motivated the creation of international carbon markets.
The carbon market also reflects ideas from economics: a fear that poor management
of Earth’s resources might adversely aﬀect or even limit long-term economic growth, and
an understanding of how market mechanisms could be used to address externalities.
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3.1 Growth and its limits
Since the early days of economics there has been disagreement about the sources of
economic growth. Francois Quesnay and the Physiocrats, writing in the second half of
the 18th century, believed land (a finite resource) was the only source of “net prod-
uct” (Spengler, 1960; Fox-Genovese, 1976), an idea later developed to its logical end by
Malthus (1798). Adam Smith (1776) disagreed, believing that economic growth was due
to the division and specialisation of labour (Letiche, 1960; McKinley, 1960). Innova-
tion and trade—as unlimited as human ingenuity—was the source of economic growth,
which Ricardo later developed into his principle of ‘comparative advantage’ (Letiche,
1960). World events soon appeared to resolve this academic dispute. On the back of
the rapid diﬀusion of the steam engine in the early 19th century, Britain grew rapidly
(Fouquet and Pearson, 1998); it seemed growth would not be limited by the supply of
land.
However, the broader question about dependence on finite resources would reappear
again and again. Stanley Jevons (1865) argued that Britain’s rapid economic growth in
the first half of the 19th century could not possibly be sustained, since it relied merely on
ratcheting up the rate of depletion of its coal reserves. In the 1890s, however, electricity
began to replace coal as the medium for delivering power, which over time permitted
a more diversified fuel mix. Coal continued to be the dominant energy source in both
Britain and the US, but with the introduction of more eﬃcient internal combustion
engines, oil natural gas began to infiltrate the energy mix to a larger degree, especially
in the transport sector (Fouquet and Pearson, 1998; Energy Information Administration,
2002).
Again, in the 1930s and 1940s, US dependence on imports for energy and raw mate-
rials was growing. After World War II, concerns lingered that economic growth would
be vulnerable to resource prices, or that key natural resources might run out. Oil, espe-
cially, had become an important energy source, outstripping even coal by 1950 (Energy
Information Administration, 2002). The Paley Commission expressed cautious concerns
that the US was too reliant on oil imports (United States President’s Materials Pol-
icy Commission, 1952). Hubbert (1956) formulated the influential theory of ‘peak oil’,
predicting that both oil and natural gas production would peak around 1965-1970.
Meanwhile, two contemporaries of climate scientists Roger Revelle and Charles Keel-
ing, Ewing and Donn (1956), published an article arguing that if the Arctic ice sheet gave
way to open ocean, snowfall would increase at high latitudes, triggering glacial advance
and global cooling. Declining temperatures in the 1950s and 1960s seemed to be evidence
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that global cooling was already underway (Fleming, 1998). These global cooling fears
were compounded by other scientific discoveries in the 1960s showing the cooling eﬀects
of aerosol pollution. The prospect of global cooling engendered grave concerns about
food production, conflict, and mass migration (Fleming, 1998). This reaction may have
been in part due to the political climate of the Cold War. Nevertheless, for the first time
reports were written on the dangers of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. The
US President’s Science Advisory Committee (1965), for instance, issued a warning of
the dangers of anthropogenic climate change. They argued that emissions would cause
climate change, but did not specify whether there would be warming or cooling.
Whether the Earth was warming or cooling, it quickly became clear that economists
they were ill-equipped to analyse the economic implications of climate change. They
had debated the growth implications of natural resource dependence for centuries, but
the focus had been on more traditional natural resources (e.g. coal and oil), largely
overlooking society’s dependence on ecosystem services (e.g. the atmosphere and oceans
as pollution sinks). Perhaps pollution, rather than exhaustion, would provide the ul-
timate constraint on economic growth? One metaphor reflected this shift in economic
thinking—‘Spaceship Earth’ (Boulding, 1965, 1966; Ward, 1966).
As long as man was small in numbers and limited in technology, he could
realistically regard the earth as an infinite reservoir, and infinite source of
inputs and an infinite cesspool for outputs. Today we can no longer make
this assumption. Earth has become a space ship. . . In a space ship there are
no sewers.
—Boulding (1965, p. 1)
In this spirit, the Club of Rome embarked on a major interdisciplinary eﬀort to
investigate “the predicament of mankind”. Their first report predicted that known
reserves of oil and natural gas would be exhausted by the early 1990s, that coal reserves
would be depleted sometime in the second half of the 21st century, and a number of
other metals and minerals would run out soon. It also predicted that “industrial growth
will certainly stop within the next century, at the latest” (Meadows et al., 1972, p. 126).
Economists Robert Solow (1973) retorted that a constant level of consumption was
even achievable in an economy perpetually dependent on a finite resource, even without
technological progress.4 But the Club of Rome left a much more important legacy than
4Solow’s updated version of Trevor Swan’s growth model would perhaps rank as his better known
contribution to the theory of economic growth. This, however, is an infinite-resource model, and will
not be discussed here.
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its predictions about the more traditional natural resources, which had been the main fo-
cus of Solow’s criticism. They had emphasised the complex web of economy-environment
interactions, and their model included elements of both pollution and exhaustion—
perhaps the world’s first integrated assessment model.
This debate underlined the diﬀerence between dependence on traditional natural re-
sources, which could be managed by relatively well-functioning markets, and dependence
on ecosystem services, for which markets did not exist. Economists still had little to say
about the growth prospects for an economy dependent on ecosystem services, and now
anthropogenic global warming was an example where ecosystem dependence might be
put to the test. The relationship between economic growth and the greenhouse eﬀect
was clearly in need of further examination.
Economist William Nordhaus (1974) addressed the issue head on, arguing that un-
acceptable human enhancement of the greenhouse eﬀect may constrain economic growth
before the physical scarcity of energy resources ever would become a problem. His
writings began to shift the debate from exhaustion to pollution, and climate change was
now finally beginning to be acknowledged and examined as a major concern for economic
growth. Scientists had learnt a lot about the physical mechanisms, and economists now
better understood the potential economic implications. All appeared to agree about the
magnitude of the problem, but what could be done to fix it?
3.2 Markets for pollution
Adam Smith recognised the problem presented by externalities, and argued that the
government should step in to resolve such failures of coordination (Smith, 1776, p. 690).
John Stuart Mill, recognised the same problem, but was not as eager to proclaim gov-
ernment as the solution. Mill argued for an economic test to determine the limits of
government intervention, but was never able to develop such a test (Medema, 2003).
Henry Sidgwick (1883) went even further in trying to explain the origin of this dis-
crepancy between private and social interests, and Sidgwick even married the idea of
externalities with the climate in one of his examples. He wrote that “if it is economi-
cally advantageous to a nation to keep up forests, on account of their beneficial eﬀects in
moderating and equalizing rainfall, the advantage is one which private enterprise has no
tendency to provide; since no one could appropriate and sell improvements in climate”
(p. 413). Thus, if the government could be trusted, it could act on behalf of the public
interest when markets failed.
Alfred Marshall began thinking about using economic incentives instead. At a hear-
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ing for the Royal Commission on Labour, during a discussion about the growth of cities,
Marshall asks if the witness is aware of proposals “that every person putting up a house
in a district that has got as closely populated as is good, should be compelled to con-
tribute towards providing free playgrounds?” (Royal Commission on Labour, 1893, p.
611).5 Marshall’s star pupil, Arthur Pigou (1912), delved deeper into the subject, and,
quoting Marshall (above), argued that “the principle [was] obviously susceptible of gen-
eral application” (p. 164).
Pigou discussed examples like street lights, light-houses, and especially smoke pollu-
tion.6 Smoke pollution was such a clear and easy-to-relate-to example of externalities at
the time, but unfortunately also seemed to communicate that externalities were largely
‘nuisance’ problems of no great macroeconomic significance. This can be contrasted with
Sidgwick’s earlier examples, where externalities could even change the climate.
Ronald Coase (1959, 1960) continued the focus on ‘nuisance’ problems like feuds
between neighbours, but broke with Pigou in one important respect. He criticised
“economists who, following Pigou, approach the problem [of social cost] in terms of
a diﬀerence between private and social products but fail to make clear that the suppres-
sion of the harm which A inflicts on B inevitably inflicts harm on A”. “The reciprocal
nature of the relationship”, he wrote, “tends to be ignored”. Reciprocity implies that,
“once the legal rights of the parties are established, negotiation is possible” (p. 26).
“The delimitation of rights is an essential prelude to market transaction” (p. 27), and
thus, “it can be left to market transactions to bring an optimum utilization of rights”,
however those rights are initially allocated.
The problem with tradeable rights was transactions costs. On the problem of smoke
pollution, Coase wrote that
. . . if many people are harmed and there are several sources of pollution, it
is more diﬃcult to reach a satisfactory solution through the market. When
the transfer of rights has to come about as a result of market transactions
carried out between large numbers of people or organizations acting jointly,
5Marshall’s academic work on ‘external economies and diseconomies’ considered a wholly diﬀerent set
of economic questions. He wondered if externalities could explain the development and agglomeration
of industry.
6As an interesting side note, the focus on smoke pollution was likely due to the growing problem of
smoke pollution in British cities at the time. Ever since more eﬃcient chimneys had been introduced
in the 15th century, individuals were able to externalise smoke pollution (Brimblecombe, 1987). By
the 19th century, rapid urbanisation and Britain’s growing use of coal, in combination with ineﬃcient
stoves and iron smelting practices produced considerable smoke in British cities. Emissions rose rapidly
throughout the 1800s, and London was becoming known as one of the most polluted cities in the world
(Brimblecombe, 1977; Fouquet and Pearson, 1998).
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the process of negotiation may be so diﬃcult and time-consuming as to make
such transfers a practical impossibility. . . As a practical matter, the market
may become too costly to operate.
He continues to say that
In these circumstances it may be preferable to impose special regulations. . . Thus
the problem of smoke pollution may be dealt with by regulations which spec-
ify the kind of heating and power equipment which can be used in houses and
factories or which confine manufacturing establishments to certain districts
by zoning arrangements.
—Coase (1959, p. 29)
Coase, it seems, thought emissions trading was a bad idea. Thomas Crocker (1966),
however, argued that there were important advantages in using a system of tradeable
permits for air pollution, because it allowed the regulator to learn from the price signal.
John Dales (1968a,b) believed that, with taxes or subsidies, “all dischargers would reduce
their wastes up to the point where the marginal cost of doing so equalled the subsidy
provided, or the charge levied” (Dales, 1968a, p. 800), but that it would be incredibly
diﬃcult to set and continually adjust taxes to achieve the desired environmental quality.
In the context of water pollution, he thought that a better alternative was to
Let [the government]. . . issue x pollution rights and put them up for sale,
simultaneously passing a law that everyone who discharges one equivalent
ton of waste into the natural water system during a year must hold one
pollution right throughout the year. . . The virtues of the market mechanism
are that no person, or agency, has to set the price—it is set by the competition
among buyers and seller of rights. . .
—Dales (1968a, p. 801)
In subsequent years Baumol and Oates (1971) formally demonstrated the least-cost
property of environmental taxes, and Montgomery (1972) did the same with emissions
trading. Weitzman (1974) in fact showed that “[i]n an environment of complete knowl-
edge and perfect certainty, there is a formal identity between the use of prices and
quantities as planning instruments. If there is any advantage to employing price or
quantity control modes, therefore, it must be due to inadequate information or uncer-
tainty” (p. 480). In such a world, “neither instrument yields an optimum ex post. The
relevant question is which one comes closer under what circumstances.” (p. 482). The
instrument choice debate flourished, with important early contributions from Roberts
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and Spence (1976), Adar and Griﬃn (1976), Yohe (1977), and Baumol and Oates (1979).
The theory of emissions trading was becoming better understood, but it was still largely
focused on local pollution problems. Emissions trading could perhaps remedy such ‘nui-
sance’ problems, but no one was proposing to use it to tackle climate change.
4 Political origins
Even though climate scientists had appreciated that greenhouse gas emissions would
impact the Earth’s climate since the turn of the century, in the political arena, air
pollution was still considered an essentially local problem even through the 1960s. When
the US National Air Pollution Control Administration compared the cost-eﬀectiveness
of alternative pollution abatement strategies, they did so on a city-by-city basis (Burton
and Sanjour, 1968, 1969a,b).
The environmental movement in the US had been growing in the 1950s and 1960s,
but the prevailing view, especially among businesses, was that restraining pollution
would act as a ‘growth-ban’ (Cook, 1988). The academic work of Coase, Crocker, and
Dales provided an innovative solution to local pollution problems that might satisfy both
environmentalists and businesses: a cap on pollution, but flexibility in how to achieve
that target. Burton’s and Sanjour’s analyses began looking at the possibilities for using
market-based instruments, like emissions trading. The US Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), established in 1970 under the Republican President Richard Nixon, soon
began experimenting with such ‘flexible regulations’. The EPA began allowing some
firms to transfer their emissions quotas internally between its facilities, as if the firm
existed under a ‘bubble’. Before long it extended the principle to allow transfers between
firms, creating the ‘oﬀset mechanism’ (Vosharp, 2007). Oﬀsets received oﬃcial sanction
through the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act.
The EPA continued to experiment with and expand the use of market-based instru-
ments under both the Carter and Reagan administrations, introducing, for instance,
‘emission reduction units’ as a currency for compliance (Vosharp, 2007), as well as ‘net-
ting’ and ‘banking’ of these units (Gorman and Solomon, 2002). In the late 1970s, as
leaded petrol was being phased down in the US, a refinery that could not meet its target
lead-content could secure the right be averaged with a refinery that went beyond its tar-
get. Both refineries were considered in compliance as long as the average lead-content
of petrol met the overall target (Gorman and Solomon, 2002).
In 1982, the EPA presented an Emissions Trading Policy Statement consolidating
these new practices (although final publication was delayed until 1986). In 1985, Tieten-
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berg (1985) published a study evaluating the EPA’s de facto emissions trading system.
He “pulled the nascent policy scheme out from the shadow of the command-and-control
regime and highlighted it as a first instance of a new policy instrument in practice, a
proof of the principle that emission reduction obligations could be traded” (Vosharp,
2007, p. 334).
Tietenberg’s report was significant, also, because alongside the standard argument
of static production eﬃciency, which had so often been used in favour of emissions
trading, he argued that emissions trading provided the right incentives for innovation
and investment in pollution control. Kneese and Schultze (1975) had formulated the
influential view that:
Over the long haul, perhaps the most important single criterion on which to
judge environmental policies is the extent to which they spur new technology
toward the eﬃcient conservation of the environment.
—Kneese and Schultze (1975, p. 38)
The need for innovation and investment incentives in pollution control was now increas-
ingly recognised. Downing and White (1986) argued in favour of emissions trading on
this basis. The economic arguments about static and dynamic eﬃciency slowly began to
gain favour, and advocacy for emissions trading in the US soon spread beyond the EPA
to groups like Project 88 and the Environmental Defense Fund. The shift in attitude
in the 1980s towards more flexible environmental regulations was also greatly facilitated
and encouraged by the broader push for neoliberal economic policies that was taking
place under the stewardship of the Reagan administration.
On a largely parallel political track, two pollution problems were increasingly recog-
nised to be international in reach, rather than local: (1) sulphur dioxide emissions from
burning coal and oil was causing water acidification, and (2) emissions of chlorofluorocar-
bons depleted stratospheric ozone (Bolin, 2007). In response to growing concerns about
water acidification, the U.N. convened the Conference on the Human Environment in
June 1972, producing the Stockholm Declaration (Bolin, 2007). A few years later, the
Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in 1975 set out,
among the aims for future co-operation, the “desulphurization of fossil fuels and exhaust
gases, pollution control of heavy metals, particles, aerosols, nitrogen oxides, in particular
those emitted by transport, power stations, and other industrial plants”, agreeing, as a
specific measure, to “develop through international co-operation an extensive programme
for the monitoring and evaluation of the long-range transport of air pollutants, starting
with sulphur dioxide”. The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution in
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1979 was more aggressively worded, but did not mandate any emission reduction tar-
gets. When binding emissions reductions finally made it into the Helsinki Protocol in
1985, it mandated uniform 30% reductions of sulphur emissions by 1993, against 1980
levels. Economic principles are conspicuously absent from such a solution, but at least
it recognised some pollution problems went beyond local, or even national regulation.
On the issue of ozone depletion, a voluntary international agreement in 1978 to
reduce chlorofluorocarbons emissions was followed by The Vienna Convention for the
Protection of the Ozone Layer in 1985. In 1987, two years after British scientists had
discovered a marked thinning of the ozone layer over the Antarctic, the Montreal Protocol
was agreed. It added binding emissions reduction targets to the Vienna Convention, but
perhaps more notably, it included a provision to allow countries to transfer parts of their
emissions quotas to other nations. The ideas that the EPA had been experimenting with
on a much smaller scale were suddenly launched onto the international stage.
However, in practice, the quotas were strict, the emitters were few, and no accounting
procedures were included in the Protocol. As a consequence, the trading provisions were
rarely exercised (Gorman and Solomon, 2002). Although emissions did decline, there
was virtually no trading under the Montreal Protocol itself. International emissions
trading had not succeeded.
The Montreal Protocol did, nevertheless, provide the impetus for a compliance mar-
ket in the US. In 1988, the EPA instituted a regime for Protection of Stratospheric
Ozone, capping production of chlorofluorocarbons through a tradeable permit system
(Tripp and Dudek, 1989). The success of this program, combined with the growing sup-
port for emissions trading in the US, allowed George H.W. Bush to amend the Clean
Air Act in 1990. This created the US Acid Rain Program—a national permit market
for sulphur dioxide emissions. This scheme was later praised for achieving substantial
emissions reductions at a much lower cost than expected. It has since been held up as
a shining example of the potential benefits of emissions trading.
5 Carbon markets: A marriage of science, economics, and
politics
Since the days of Pigou, externalities had been viewed largely as ‘nuisance’ problems.
Even as the US environmental movement was growing in the 1950s and 1960s, the
prevailing view was still that environmental regulation would act as a ‘growth-ban’
(Cook, 1988). Environmental regulations were pursued largely in the spirit of consumer
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protection. The 1954 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea
by Oil, for instance, was prompted by specific oil spills that caused damage to people,
property, and the marine environment. The European Community’s first environmental
resolution from 1967 aimed to regulate product packaging and labeling (Sands, 2003).
Pollution was certainly a ‘nuisance’, but it was not a serious economic threat.
This view slowly began to change in the 1970s and 1980s, however. Climate scientists
continued to accumulate evidence of global warming, and economist William Nordhaus
(1974, 1977a,b, 1979) warned of the potential economic consequences of global warming.
He described greenhouse gas emissions as “a pure example of an externality” Nordhaus
(1977a, p. 19), calling it “the most extreme imaginable form of external diseconomy”
(Nordhaus, 1977b, p. 342).
In 1987, the U.N. World Commission on Environment and Development published
their report on Our Common Future (World Commission On Environment and Develop-
ment, 1987). Global warming, and the necessity of managing climate change, was clearly
recognised. Highlighting problems of over-exploitation of environmental resources, the
report defined a new political agenda around the concept of ‘sustainable development’. It
recognised that our economic future was fused to our ability to manage global common-
pool natural resources, such as the atmosphere.
In 1988, a hot summer and crop failure in the US sparked a wider political dis-
cussions about anthropogenic global warming. NASA scientist James Hansen testified
before the US Congress, declaring that “global warming has begun”, a statement that
echoed around the world (Fleming, 1998; Bolin, 2007). The World Conference on the
Changing Atmosphere held that same year called for a 20% reduction of carbon dioxide
emissions by 2005, against 1988 levels. Later that year, the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) was created to conduct a comprehensive scientific assessment
of the causes and consequences of global warming. An externality like excess greenhouse
gas emissions, it was now abundantly clear, was much more than just a ‘nuisance’. If
unchecked, it could pose a serious economic threat.
Putting the problem of climate change together with the theory of emissions trading,
Swisher and Masters (1989) argued that we should use an “international market mech-
anism that assigns value to climate protection”, using “international carbon emissions
oﬀsets” as currency. The US filed a concept paper with a similar proposal to the IPCC
the same year, and Victor (1991) argued that it was feasible to implement such a scheme
to manage carbon dioxide emissions. Dudek and LeBanc (1990) of the Environmental
Defense Fund proposed even broader oﬀsetting mechanisms that would include forestry
oﬀsets.
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The UN convened the Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro
in 1992, producing the Framework Convention on Climate Change (United Nations,
1992). Its 156 signatories declared their “concern that human activities have been sub-
stantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. . . and may ad-
versely aﬀect natural ecosystems and humankind”. The Convention established an inter-
national framework within which it would be possible to limit anthropogenic greenhouse
gas emissions. It also demanded that “policies and measures to deal with climate change
should be cost-eﬀective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost”. This
was a clarion call for economists.
Many economists turned their attention to questions of formulating an interna-
tional environmental treaty and designing an international market for greenhouse gases.
Michael Grubb, Peter Bohm, Scott Barrett, Graciella Chichilnisky, Richard Sandor and
many others made important contributions to the growing debate.7 By 1992, both the
UNCTAD and OECD had already presented their own analyses of a possible interna-
tional system of tradeable carbon emissions permits. When the IPCC completed their
second assessment report in 1995, it included a working group dedicated to examining
the economic and social dimensions of climate change. They concluded that “for a global
treaty, a tradeable quota system is the only potentially cost-eﬀective arrangement where
an agreed level of emissions is attained with certainty” (p. 401).
The recommendation rested on the standard arguments in favour of emissions trad-
ing, similar to those heard decades earlier in the discussion about local and national
emissions regulation in the US; not only would an international carbon market achieve
the target emissions reductions with certainty, but it would do so in a statically and
dynamically eﬃcient manner. That same year, in 1995, the UNFCCC launched a vol-
untary pilot market, Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ), to learn more about how an
international carbon market might work in practice.
The US initially opposed binding commitments in the lead up the Kyoto negotia-
tions, but their position shifted after the second assessment report was released. It now
favoured binding commitments as long as the new agreement included provisions for an
international carbon market. The US was one of the few countries with practical experi-
ence of emissions trading, but an alliance including the US, Australia, Canada, Iceland,
Japan, New Zealand, Norway and Russia quickly formed around the proposal for inter-
national carbon emissions trading (Stowell, 2005). The Kyoto Protocol was agreed in
7For a more comprehensive list of references to relevant papers in this period, see the bibliogra-
phy of chapter 11 of the Contribution of Working Group III to the Second Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Bruce et al., 1996).
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1997, and established an global market for greenhouse gas emissions reductions.
Since 1997, a number of emissions trading systems have been implemented across the
globe, and the political landscape of proponents and skeptics of emissions trading has
changed. The ‘flexible mechanisms’ of Kyoto went into operation in 2005, together with
compliance markets such as the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, and much has been learnt
about from these experiences.8 But the fact remains: in less than a decade, international
carbon markets had gone from being an academic idea (Swisher and Masters, 1989) to
being a central component of international climate policy.
6 Taking stock and looking forward
Climate scientists understood the anthropogenic global warming posed a grave threat,
but also that this problem was not merely a scaled up version of air pollution. In fact,
the study of climate change arose from the a wholly diﬀerent branch of the physical
sciences: the study of the ice ages and fluctuations of terrestrial temperatures. Climate
scientists were concerned with the dynamic behaviour of a global system. The climate
system was full of positive and negative feedback mechanisms, and could respond in
complex ways to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. Economists, however, were
oﬀering a scaled up version of the solution to air pollution.
The arguments in favour of emissions trading had been its ability to cap emissions
at a desired level, to achieve abatement at the lowest overall cost, and to provide the
right incentives for firms to innovate in environmentally friendly technologies. The same
arguments were now put forth to support the recommendation of an international carbon
market. After all, schemes like the US Acid Rain Program were proof that this was not
only theory, but really did work in practice. Things were moving very quickly in the
early 1990s. Climate change was a problem in search of a solution, and emissions trading
was a solution in search of a problem. Despite the failure of the one truly international
emissions trading scheme that had existed up to this point under the Montreal Protocol,
politicians, rushing take action against the climatic threat, were willing to buy this
solution if it meant getting the US on board.
From this perspective, many of the problems that international carbon markets have
experienced in recent years are easier to understand. While local and national trading
schemes had institutions in place for allocating emissions rights, the “hot air” in the Ky-
oto Protocol and overallocation of allowances in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU
8To read more about post-1997 developments, see Stowell (2005), Vosharp (2007), Bolin (2007), Brohe´
et al. (2009), and Ellerman et al. (2010).
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ETS) (Reyes, 2011) are symptoms of the absence of comparable international mecha-
nisms. The VAT fraud and the recycling of already surrendered emissions allowances are
similarly symptoms of the much more underdeveloped area of international law enforce-
ment. While local and national trading schemes had dealt with a very limited number
of pollutants and where the key abatement technologies were all known in advance, the
admission of HFC-23 projects into the Clean Development Mechanism (Wara, 2007a,b)
is a symptom of the much more inadequate understanding of the abatement options for
greenhouse gases. In light of all these institutional failures, it would perhaps not be
a surprise to anyone if the international carbon markets have not provided the strong
long-term price signal needed to incentivise low-carbon innovation.
The historical perspective helps us understand why international carbon markets so
far have failed in several important respects, but also helps us understand how carbon
markets must change if they are to have hope of realising the benefits they promise. I
will suggest two main conclusions.
Firstly, while emissions trading was first developed to deal with more or less localised
air and water pollution, the science of anthropogenic global warming did not emerge as
a scaled up version of local air or water pollution. The original problem was to explain
terrestrial temperatures. The climate system is associated with a much higher degree
of scientific uncertainty than systems dealt with by previous emissions trading regimes,
and exhibits very diﬀerent dynamic properties. Experiences with international carbon
markets suggest that all of the incongruences between the climate science and the theory
of emissions trading have not been ironed out yet, so it is important not to let emissions
trading be the be-all and end-all of carbon policy. Rather, it can be a part of a carbon
policy portfolio, which has room for back-up options, like geo-engineering, that are better
suited to dealing with the kinds of catastrophic climate risks that emissions trading was
never intended to address in the first place.
Secondly, an unreasonable degree of institutional homogeneity and low transactions
costs was implicit when the small-scale theory and experience of emissions trading was
applied on a global scale. The instrument choice debate had long recognised that the
costs of operating any particular combination of policy instruments in a given environ-
ment is crucial in determining the optimal instrument mix. Weitzman readily admitted
that his analysis did not go nearly far enough in accounting for administrative and other
operational costs (Weitzman, 1974, p. 481). There is a small literature on conducting en-
vironmental policy in the presence of administrative costs (Mitchell Polinsky and Shavell,
1982; Stavins, 1995; Woerdman, 2001), but it needs to be expanded and integrated into
analysis of the global carbon market. This will inform policy makers of the appropriate
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role of international carbon markets within a broader portfolio of policies. It can help
make sure that international carbon policies are complementary, and that markets are
used only to address that part of the problem for which they are most eﬀective.
More a historical observation than a lesson, it is perhaps encouraging to note that
while externalities were for a long time considered ‘nuisances’, regulated mainly to pro-
tect consumers, greenhouse gas emissions are now widely recognised as a threat to eco-
nomic growth. Climate change regulations are still viewed as a ‘growth-ban’ in several
countries, but the trend is towards recognising climate change itself is the greater threat.
International carbon markets combines climate science, the economics of emissions
trading, and the international treaty making. A panoramic historical perspective sug-
gests the combination is better described as a hasty marriage than a carefully engineered
synthesis. The many problems with international carbon markets appear to have resulted
from incongruences between the contributions made from each camp. Carbon markets
are likely to continue playing an important role in international carbon policy, and prac-
tical experience with carbon markets continues to provide information for researchers
and policy makers about the nature of remaining incongruences. Future eﬀorts should go
beyond the surface and focus more on understanding the more fundamental restrictions
on the ability of international carbon markets to address climate change. This will help
ensure that carbon markets are given an appropriate role in climate policy. Only then
will international carbon markets be able to realise the benefits they promise.
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